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Designing a regulatory and supervisory framework  
for integrated financial markets 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In modern industrial countries, financial markets have rapidly evolved in the last decades. 
The new technologies and the progress in information communication and disclosure have also 
induced a growing globalization of finance. This path can be observed with regard to banking and 
financial intermediaries, capital markets and financial instruments. On one side, there is an 
increasing integration of functions, instruments and agents in the financial sector. Banks, capital 
markets, insurance companies and other financial institutions like investment, hedge and pension 
funds show increased interdependence and multidimensional linkages. Large groups are emerging 
offering a full range of financial services and products. On the other side, such integration, which 
had previously a largely intra-national path, has become increasingly international: this has been 
favored by the adoption of a single currency in the euro area but also by the increasing 
consolidation among securities exchanges as well as post trading operators in the world. 
Mergers offer more opportunities and allow to exploit economies of scale and scope. At the same 
time, they could lead to excessive risk concentration. 
In the summer of 2007, the subprime crisis, announced by the difficulties of some leading 
US hedge funds has had an impact on monetary and financial markets throughout the world. Risk 
premia have increased everywhere. Rating agencies have been blamed for having failed to warn the 
market.  The  awkwardness of supervisors and the failure of the tripartite agreement of the three UK 
financial regulatory authorities at its first stress test has been accompanied by a true bank run in the 
UK: an event that probably no-one alive would have ever imagined could happen again. 
The crisis of Autumn 2008 (still running while we are writing) is changing the structure of 
the financial industry. We have seen: a hysterical run by the regulatory authorities in stopping short 
selling; late night meetings of EU ministers to bail-out transnational banks; the frantic decision 
throughout Europe of raising deposit insurance coverage up to non-credible limits (many times the 
GDP); repeated crashes of indexes despite massive liquidity injections by central banks; the 
complete freezing of the interbank market; brutal exchanges downsizing; and panic of the 
regulators. A plausible (and likely) outcome is the nationalization of an entire industry, with some 
big investment banks disappearing and others being transformed into commercial banks. If ever the 
industry survive, international steps in order to avoid that something like this will happen again 
must be taken. In fact, despite the continuous reforms in financial regulation in different countries, 
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described in the following section, national policy makers and authorities resist and are actually 
reluctant to accept more stringent links with foreign authorities and considerable transfer of powers. 
The problem must clearly be tackled in different ways for different geographical areas. It is not 
realistic at this moment to think about world regulators or world rules even if regulatory and 
supervisory cooperation is not sufficient any more. It has been widely argued, however, that a 
reorganization in the structure of regulators in the United States (GAO, 2007; US Treasury, 2008) 
as well as in Europe is necessary (Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2006). 
The paper is organized as follows. We start by describing some regulatory features that have 
emerged  in connection both with the process of cross border and cross sector integration in  finance 
and with the recent financial crises. In section 3, we briefly present the current state of financial 
regulation and supervision in Europe and US, as well as some recent regulatory initiatives which 
have been proposed in those countries. We discuss our own proposal for the reorganization of the 
architecture for financial regulation and supervision in section 4. Finally, we summarize and 
conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Integrated financial markets, regulation and crises.  
The definition of the term 'financial market' has traditionally included banking, financial and 
insurance segments of the industry. In the past, the boundaries dividing institutions, instruments and 
markets were clear-cut, so that further distinctions were drawn within the different classes of 
intermediaries (with banks specialized in short or medium/long term maturities, 
functional/commercial operations, deposits and investments; with financial intermediaries handling 
broker-dealer negotiations, asset management and advisory functions, and with insurance 
companies dealing in life and other insurance policies). 
The process of financial integration has produced a common space where all financial 
activities are now undertaken by entities that, although sometimes legally different, do actually 
perform the same economic functions and manage similar products. The situation is extreme in the 
case of large intermediaries that have been called “conglomerates”. Probably, a distinction must be 
taken between "financial conglomerates" whose interests are exclusively, or predominantly, in 
financial activities and "mixed conglomerates."  Mixed conglomerates are predominantly 
commercially or industrially oriented and contain at least one regulated financial entity in some part 
of their corporate structure. Here, we deal with financial conglomerates, defined as "any group of 
companies under common control whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing 
significant services in at least two different financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance)" (Bank 
for International Settlements, 1995). Many of the world's prominent financial firms are indeed 
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conglomerates.  In 2000, over 80% of the assets of the largest 500 banking organizations were 
controlled by conglomerates.  Among the largest 50 banking organizations, the proportion of 
conglomerates was 94%.  The share of banking assets controlled by conglomerates has been 
increasing in both developed and developing countries. Most of these large conglomerates are 
active internationally (Huerta, 2005). If we take a look at the EU we can find about 68 
conglomerates1 according to the 2002/87 directive, other 2 are in Switzerland, 6 in the US and 1 in 
Australia. In general, these conglomerates operate in 2 countries; with a few exceptions they are 
present in more countries (Allianz, for example, is an insurance group operating in 10 EU 
countries). The EU Directive sets out requirements on solvency, in particular to prevent the same 
capital being used more than once as a buffer against risk in different legal entities in the same 
conglomerate (multiple gearing of capital). Besides, it tries to ensure that the concentration of risk 
at group level, and transactions between entities in the same conglomerate, are appropriate. It also 
focuses on risk management and internal control systems. But the most important feature deals with 
the lead supervisor function: a single supervisory authority should be appointed to coordinate the 
overall supervision of a conglomerate. Many events in the last years show the difficulty of such 
arrangements and provide evidence of a multidimensional problem that includes geography, type of 
business, type of regulator, size of the supervised entities and bankruptcy arrangements. Some 
problems clearly arise from regulation and supervision. Even in federal systems, like the US, or in 
common economic areas, like the EU, where a subset of countries has adopted a common currency, 
day to day regulation is never truly harmonized and financial conglomerates must set up different 
compliance arrangements and thus lose many of the advantages of integration. In the EU, the 
situation is even worse: the implementation tables by the EU Commission show an excellent track 
record of all the Member States2. However, despite the adoption of the Lamfalussy procedures for 
many of the financial services directives3, in practice regulation is quite different in different 
countries. Some pieces of Level 1 directives are in the Member States’ legislation, others in 
secondary regulatory arrangements (Level 2); at the same time pieces of Level 2 are in the national 
laws while others in the secondary regulations. Sometimes, the national Parliament and the 
competent authorities change substantially the Directives (going “beyond the floor” in the case of 
minimum harmonization, or “beyond the roof” in the case of maximum harmonization)4. The recent 
                                                 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/docs/200711_conglomerates_en.pdf. 
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/transposition_en.pdf. 
3 Level 1 of the Lamfalussy approach consists of framework Directives or Regulations. At Level 2, four regulatory 
Committees assist the Commission in adopting implementing measures, ensuring that technical provisions can be kept 
up to date with market developments. Committees of national supervisors are responsible for Level 3 measures, which 
aim to improve the implementation of Level 1 and 2 acts in the Member States. At Level 4, the Commission will 
strengthen the enforcement of EU law. 
4 See the problems arisen in the implementation of the market abuse in the report by ESME at 
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crisis also tested the EU supervisory arrangements in relation to financial conglomerates: despite 
the absence of a political and fiscal union, policy makers were relatively efficient in solving 
overnight the crisis of Fortis, even if the net result was the separation of the bank in different 
domestic entities. 
 
It is wise to underline that even in a single country coordination mechanisms among 
different agencies prove to be difficult, especially during a crisis. Different existing regulatory 
models --“single regulator”, “twin peaks”, “institutional” or by nature of the intermediary (bank, 
insurance or securities) -- create frictions given the different objectives that an agency pursues. 
Even in the case of a single regulator, it is possible that different departments try to maximize 
different utility functions.  A crisis acts as a stress test of a regulatory model. At the national level, 
typically the lender of last resort is the central bank providing liquidity to the whole market and/or 
to the (illiquid but not insolvent) commercial banks. In the Euro countries, it is not clear any longer 
who is in charge of the lender of last resort function. Different arrangements can be stipulated 
between the prudential supervisor and the central bank; but which one? The national one, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) or the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as a whole? In the 
case of the recent bail-outs, all traditional instruments have been exploited (sometimes in a creative 
way): direct government intervention, central bank intervention, deposit insurance. And all types of 
intermediaries have been involved: commercial and investment banks, investment and hedge funds, 
investment firms, insurance firms; the traditional segmentation of banking, capital markets and 
insurance has been finally defeated by the events.  
The current crisis does not seem to have been started by conglomerates per se:  the big 
investment banks that were bailed out or failed were not conglomerates. Some big commercial 
banks have de facto become hedge funds because of their high leverage. Mistakes in financial 
regulation and supervision have been underlined: from pro-cyclical capital ratios, arising from both 
Basle 1 and 2, to the new accounting rules on fair value and mark to market;  from the key role 
given to rating agencies by central banks (who wrote Basle 2 rules?) to excessive leverage ratios (by 
permitting to hold unlimited amounts of AAA-rated structured financial products). All this is 
relevant for a broad class of financial intermediaries. However, although in integrated financial 
markets financial conglomerates have a leading role and contribute either to spread out faster or to 
better absorb the crisis, no dedicated intervention has been produced in the form of any new and 
special supranational rule and supervisory measure explicitly tailored for these players. In an 
international context, and also with respect to conglomerates, the big cases of the last years, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/esme/index_en.htm.  
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although in a different way (Herstatt, Drexel Burnham Lambert, BCCI, Barings and LTCM) show a 
“too complex to fail issue” (Herring 2005) where the lack of an international lender of last resort 
(Guttentag and Herring, 1983) or of a global deposit insurance scheme surely deserve further 
analysis (Fisher, 1999)5. But the events of the autumn 2008 (the bail out of Bear Sterns and AIG, 
the default of Lehman, the intervention of Bank of America in Merrill Lynch in the US; the near 
nationalization of the entire banking system in the UK and Germany; full guarantee provided on 
deposits and maybe other kind of liabilities) show much bigger problems than those specific to 
conglomerates. The enormous provision of fresh capital (through direct injection of capital, 
government loans or the purchase of toxic assets) and the new rules on deposit insurance show an 
elementary concept: a bail out, in any particular form, is (and must be) a decision whose 
responsibility falls only on the policy maker. The policy maker can be assisted by the financial 
market authorities and the central bank, but in a way that makes explicit that these entities are 
independent agencies. On the contrary, often in the recent past bail out decisions have been taken by 
central banks, as lender of last resort, or by the competent supervisory authorities (sometimes 
central banks). The intervention of an independent authority for bailing out carries out a relevant 
risk: the loss of independence and reputation. The net result of the Fed intervention in the AIG case 
is the loss of independence with respect to the US Treasury. The summer events of Northern Rock 
instead of showing only a “bank” panic have showed a “central bank panic” and the crash of any 
residual credibility of the UK authorities. The latter, scared by the queues at the bank, have publicly 
declared that they would have guaranteed all depositors and basically the bank, which was, inter 
alia, a listed company, thus introducing an asymmetry in the treatment of external investors that 
poses new and difficult questions. 
While in the US the policy maker is federal (as well as the taxpayer), in Europe both of them 
are still national. This is the reason of the stubborn existence of national authorities that, while the 
ECB acts more or less in coordination with other central banks, do not show sufficient coordination 
in the analysis of the situation and in the sharing of confidential information. Current arrangements 
for coordinating national supervisory activities are overly complex and burdensome. They have 
proved incapable of ensuring efficient area-wide supervisory teamwork during a crisis. The Level 3 
Committees (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Committee of European Securities 
Regulators and Committee of European Insurance Occupational and Pension Supervisors), in spite 
of excellent but limited permanent staff, depend wholly on their constituent authorities and have 
rigidly tripartite competence (banks, securities and insurance) according to an obsolescent view of 
the regulatory and supervisory framework. This has two regrettable consequences. It creates an 
                                                 
5 The management of the August 2007 subprime crisis resulted in a voluntary initiative by Citi and othe US big banks to 
create a new and dedicated fund to give liquidity to the subprime market. 
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extra regulatory burden entailing a loss of competitiveness for Europe’s financial industry and it 
offers inadequate protection for investors. We must therefore now act decisively to enhance 
European supervisory structures. This applies in particular to the euro area, where a single payment 
infrastructure and a single liquidity source are in place. 
 
3. The Current State of Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe and the United 
States. 
 In each country, financial markets regulation has been affected by the structure and the 
evolution of the domestic financial system as well as by the legal system in place. Table 1 
summarizes the current state of financial market regulatory and supervisory arrangements in the 
European Union and the United States. 
 
The US situation 
In the US, the structure of financial regulators and supervisors is quite complex. On the 
banking side, there are four Federal banking agencies: the Federal Reserve, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrifts Supervision (OTS) and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Furthermore there are fifty state banking departments. On 
the securities side, regulation and supervision are split among two federal entities: the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures and Trading Commission (CFTC). The 
former protects investors, maintains fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitates capital 
formation through overseeing the key participants in the securities world, including securities 
exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, listed companies and mutual funds. 
The SEC promotes the disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining fair dealing, 
and protecting against fraud. The SEC outsources much of its oversight responsibility to two self-
regulatory organizations, the NYSE and the NASD. The CFTC is in charge of derivatives markets. 
On the insurance side, there is no federal entity: fifty state insurance departments are in charge of 
regulation and supervision. Some sort of coordination on financial markets is ensured by the 
President's Working Group on Financial Markets whose members are the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Chairman of the SEC and the Chairman of the CFTC.  
The current structure of financial regulation and supervision is cumbersome with 
overlapping agencies and increasing cost for the industry (Dearie and Vojta 2007). In October 2007, 
the US Department of Treasury (Treasury for short)  has sought comments to a document6 that asks 
how the regulatory structure of the U.S. financial system should be changed. According to this 
                                                 
6 http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/federalregisternoticehp602.pdf 
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document, much of the basic regulatory structure associated with financial institutions was 
established decades ago. While there have been important changes over time in the way financial 
institutions have been regulated, the US regulatory structure has basically remained the same7 .  
 The recent GAO report on financial regulation underlines that the current US regulatory 
structure, with multiple agencies that oversee segments of the financial services industry, is 
challenged by a number of industry trends8. The development of large, complex, internationally 
active firms, whose product offerings span the jurisdiction of several agencies, creates the potential 
for inconsistent regulatory treatment of similar products, gaps in consumer and investor protection, 
or duplication among regulators. GAO has recommended several options to accomplish 
modernization of the federal financial regulatory structure; these include consolidating certain 
regulatory functions as well as having a single regulator for large, complex firms.  Finally, as part of 
Secretary H. Paulson’s initiative to strengthen U.S. financial markets’ competitiveness in the global 
economy9, the Treasury has published the “Blueprint for a modernized financial regulatory 
structure”10. The document proposes a new architecture for US financial regulation recommending 
a regulatory model based on objectives, to more closely link the regulatory structure to the reasons 
of regulation. The model is inspired by the Australian model and some academic literature (Herring 
and Carmassi, 2008; Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 2003). The model proposes three regulators: one 
focused on market stability across the entire financial sector, another on safety and soundness of 
those institutions supported by a federal guarantee, and a third on protecting consumers and 
investors. The market stability regulator would be the Federal Reserve, whose role would be 
implemented through the traditional channels of monetary policy and liquidity provision to the 
financial system. In addition, the Federal Reserve would be given new and critically important 
regulatory powers dealing with the overall financial system and would have access to information 
about a broad range of intermediaries including insurance firms. It will also have the responsibility 
regarding OTC derivatives markets, and clearing and settlement functions. It is also contemplated 
the creation of a Federal Prudential Financial Regulator that would combine all federal bank 
charters into one charter and would consolidate all federal bank regulators into a single prudential 
regulator. For increased regulatory efficiency, the Blueprint recommends a federal insurance charter 
                                                 
7 In particular, the Treasury is asking inputs on a number of “General Issues” about the financial system at large, 
including whether the current regulatory structure adequately addresses consumer or investor protection and if the 
eventual creation of a single financial market regulator or otherwise consolidating financial regulation would be 
advisable. Furthermore, the Treasury wants to discuss in-depth specific issues like the central bank’s role in regulatory 
supervision and setting monetary policy, the deposit insurer’s proper level of authority and a greater federal 
involvement in insurance regulation. 
8 GAO report on Financial Regulation, October 2007 (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0832.pdf) 
9 http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp476.htm 
10  http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf. 
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and puts oversight of these guaranteed products within the jurisdiction of the Federal Prudential 
Financial Regulator. This should replace the OCC, the OTC and the FDIC. The Conduct of 
Business Regulator would have the power and the responsibility to monitor business conduct 
regulation across all types of financial institutions and entities. Business conduct regulation in this 
context includes several key aspects of consumer protection such as disclosures, business practices, 
chartering and licensing of certain types of financial institutions, and rigorous enforcement 
programs. This agency would assume many of the roles of the CFTC, the SEC, and the different 
consumer protection and enforcement roles today assigned to insurance and banking regulators.  
 
The EU situation 
 In the EU, in general, regulation focuses first on banking intermediaries, given their 
traditional dominant role in the financial sector in continental Europe. Most of the recent changes 
have been induced in member countries under the pressure of EC directives and of increasing cross-
border financial market integration that first stimulated and then followed the 1992 single market 
program and the adoption of the Euro. However, apart from member countries’ implicit 
commitment to ensure that all financial sectors were adequately regulated and supervised, no 
European law explicitly deals with the problem of how regulating and supervising financial markets 
and intermediaries. As a consequence, the current picture in the EU is that of a combination of 
different regulatory approaches. Moreover, in many member countries there is neither a “pure” 
regulatory model adopted throughout the national financial system. 
The Nordic countries, the UK and more recently Austria, Belgium and Germany, have 
chosen to delegate financial regulation and supervision to a unique agency, separated by the central 
bank. This is a coherent and integral application of the “Single-Regulator” supervisory model, 
based on just one control authority with responsibility over all markets and intermediaries. This 
authority is concerned with all aspects of regulation, but in particular with microeconomic stability 
and investor protection. In a few other countries, the traditional “institutional” model seems still in 
place for the insurance sector. In Luxembourg and Finland, a unique agency is responsible for 
supervision on banking activities, securities markets and investment funds and firms, but not for 
insurance. As a matter of fact, contracts involving life insurance and capitalization provide services 
that are directly tied to investment funds or to stock exchange or other financial indices (unit-linked 
or index-linked contracts). The inclusion of the life insurance segment would be a welcome change 
given that the distinctiveness of most schemes of life insurance compared to other financial 
products has been considerably lessened. A specialized “institutional” supervisor is also widely in 
place for the securities markets: in countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain, this security supervisor 
is the responsible for investor protection, while the objective of safeguarding stability is assigned to 
 10
the central bank; in this case, we may say that we have a partial application of the regulatory model 
by objective. A full application of the twin-peak model is found in the recent Dutch reform, 
establishing a single authority for financial market transparency and investor protection, while 
leaving the supervisory responsibility for microeconomic stability to the central bank. In many 
countries, banking supervision is one of the functions of the national central bank, but only in a very 
few cases the central bank is still a “monopolist” in the prudential regulation business (Italy, 
Portugal and Spain).11  
There is no point in having a common monetary policy in the Euro area while keeping 
different financial regulations and supervisory rules in each member country. As a matter of fact, 
these institutional differences are an important barrier to further financial integration and could as 
well prove to be an impeding factor to smoother transmission of the single monetary policy. In the 
field of financial regulation, the principle of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition, 
which was originally thought to be able to naturally induce over time a convergence of regulatory 
behavior and more uniform rules, did not work.  Moreover, there is a concrete risk that competition 
in this area will not even generate the more efficient outcome: on one side, there exists an incentive 
to promote less demanding domestic financial regulations and supervision in order to let the own 
country become more attractive for running financial business; on the other side, it is not clear who 
will pay the costs of potential insolvency following excessive risk taking behavior and financial 
misconduct in a member country. Finally, with increasing international banking activities and a 
European settlement system in place (Target and the planned Target2 Securities), also the argument 
that domestic regulators and supervisors have better knowledge and can exercise more efficient 
control becomes day by day less effective (Prati and Schinasi, 1999). We have already mentioned 
that there are neither clear tools nor responsibilities assigned to counter and/or manage the risk of 
financial instability and crisis in Europe (Bruni and de Boissieu, 2000).  The Treaty is silent on this 
topic. The role of lender of last resort will be performed by the ECB only in the case of a 
widespread liquidity crisis affecting the whole Euro area, as happened in the Summer 2007 and in 
the Fall 2008. What about a liquidity crisis in a single country?  And a solvency crisis?  Suppose we 
face a situation in which a single financial institution located in a member country is in trouble. 
What kind of intervention, if any, is currently allowed? The ECB will not intervene in favor of a 
single institution, especially if it is interconnected only domestically. Also because it could always 
assign some of the responsibility for the crisis to the domestic financial regulator-supervisor. The 
domestic central bank cannot intervene by providing funds without an explicit authorization by the 
                                                 
11 This classification follows Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) and it is based on observing the composition of the Basle 
Committee of Banking Supervision. Another possibility, in the EU, would be using the composition of the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). 
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ECB. In this case, it will have to convince the latter that the institution is facing a liquidity and not a 
solvency crisis, according to the old Bagehot's doctrine,  and/or that the risk of potential spread and 
contagion of the crisis is high. This requires time and resources. 
Another aspect which has been brought back to the centre of the debate in the recent crisis is 
that of deposit insurance. Explicit deposit protection may be designed to achieve different policy 
targets. However, the two main objectives are consumer protection and macroeconomic stability. 
Small depositors have to be (preferably partially) insured against losses, as they lack the ability to 
monitor the banks where they place their money. Furthermore, they have to be provided with a 
mechanism to quickly recover the funds they are supposed to use for transactions. In addition, given 
the strong links among banks, due to the working of the payment system and the management of 
monetary policy, it is necessary to avoid or at least minimize the risk that a bank failure spreads out 
fears of financial contagion in the system, inducing depositors to withdraw their funds even from 
safe and solid banks (bank runs). Deposit protection is hence viewed as an essential component in 
the financial safety net, together with the lending of last resort provided by the central bank, 
standard banking regulation and supervisory controls. 
Deposit protection is however not offered homogeneously to depositors across countries. 
The currently adopted schemes differ widely with respect to many dimensions. Deposit insurance is 
surely a function of public interest. But its provision can be assigned either to a public or to a 
private (or mixed) agency. Participation to the system can be mandatory or voluntary, and financial 
resources devoted to payouts can be collected via ex-ante contributions or by raising funds only 
when needed (ex-post). The deposit insurer can be given only the task of reimbursing depositors or 
can be assigned a broader mandate and participate to information collection, crises management and 
supervisory activities in the banking sector. Only some categories of deposits can be considered to 
be insured (or all types), and each deposit account or each depositor can be considered eligible for 
partial or full payout. In the recent crisis both US and the EU countries decided to raise the limits of 
coverage: in the US from 100.000 to 250.000 dollars, in Europe going up to 100.000 euro and /or 
adding explicit State guarantee, as in Germany, UK, Ireland, Italy, Greece. 
 
 4.  A New Architecture for Financial Market Regulation and Supervision in Europe and US. 
The selection of a new regulatory model is not easy. However, as already stated, the old 
“institutional” model could be considered a good candidate only in a context with rigidly separated 
financial segments, and where no global players are at stake. This picture does not apply either to 
Euroland or to the US, where we already observe a high degree of integration in financial markets 
and intermediaries and where multifunctional groups and conglomerates are rapidly growing. A 
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more efficient way to regulate financial intermediaries, including financial conglomerates, would be 
the explicit adoption of an approach by objective at a federal level. While this would probably be 
more natural in the US, we think it could also be applied in the Eurosystem. At the same time, it is 
likely that the somehow chaotic attribution of regulatory powers in the US, could be considerably 
improved by deciding to adopt a new regulatory framework explicitly based on precise coordination 
devices, along some of the rules (or better the supervisory practices) already experimented in 
Europe. 
 One should start by stressing that not necessarily harmonization and delegation at a federal 
level means full centralization. If it is too late to continue with different national (or state) 
regulators and supervisors, it is probably too early to adopt a central regulator (s) and supervisor (s) 
at the Euro or US federal level. In fact, not only is the Euro or the Federal zone too large, but still 
too many different rules exist (commercial codes, company laws, failure procedures, corporate 
governance) and fiscal policies are not completely harmonized. Also, in most cases, state 
enforcement might still be desirable. In our opinion, a feasible solution is based on a federal 
approach to financial regulation and supervision, which could be organized with a structure similar 
to the one established for monetary policy within the ESCB.  
 The regulatory and supervisory model by objectives could be the right model. This 
postulates that all intermediaries and markets be subjected to the control of more than one authority, 
each single authority being responsible for one objective of regulation regardless of both the legal 
form of the intermediaries and of the functions or activities they perform.  According to this 
scheme, an authority possibly different from the central bank, which remains in charge for monetary 
policy and macro-stability, is to watch over prudential regulation and micro-stability of both 
markets and all intermediaries.  This agency is to supervise the stability of the entire financial 
market and of individual financial intermediaries, by licensing authorizations, controlling 
professional registers, performing inspections, giving sanctions and managing crises. This authority 
should cooperate with the central bank in supervising security settlement and payment systems and 
clearing houses, and in monitoring the use of financial instruments in wholesale markets. An 
authority responsible for transparency and investor protection should supervise disclosure 
requirements and the proper behavior of intermediaries and the orderly conduct of trading in all 
financial intermediation activities performed by banking, securities, and life insurance 
intermediaries (including discipline and control in the area of transparency in contracts). Moreover, 
this authority would be assigned powers in the area of misleading advertising by financial 
intermediaries. Finally, it should control macro-transparency in financial markets (including the 
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discipline of insider trading, takeovers and public offers).  A fourth authority should guarantee fair 
competition, prevent abuses of dominant position and limit dangerous concentrations. 
 A sketch of this “4-peak” model for financial regulation is provided in Figure 1. This 
solution seems particularly effective in a highly-integrated market context12 and in the presence of 
multifunctional operators, conglomerates and groups operating in a variety of different business 
sectors: its most attractive feature is that it provides uniform regulation for different entities 
engaged in the same activities. At the same time, it does no require an excessive proliferation of 
control units. Compared to the "institutional" or the “single regulator” model, a regulatory 
framework organized by objectives obviously produces a certain degree of overlaps. It could also 
lead to a lack of controls, given the ambiguity of specific competencies.  Since each intermediary is 
subject to the control of more than one authority, this model might prove more costly than the single 
regulator model. The intermediaries might in fact be required to produce several reports relating to 
supervision, often containing identical or similar information.  At the same time, the intermediary 
may have to justify its actions to a whole set of authorities contemporaneously, although for 
different reasons. Vice versa, a deficit of controls might occur whenever the exact areas of 
responsibility are not clearly identifiable in specific cases.  Moreover, to be effective and to avoid 
conflicts of interest among the different objectives, this regulatory model needs a coordination 
committee composed of the members of the three regulators and the central bank. In practice, 
however, the differences between the single regulator model and the one by objectives may be 
smaller. We could view the single regulator model as a 3-peak regulatory model by objective, in 
which the two objectives of prudential supervision and investor protection are given to a single  
agency.  
 The horizontal 3 or 4-peak proposal would be inserted into a vertical structure in Europe, 
and probably also in the US. As already stressed, whether financial “regulation” in the Euro area 
would be fully centralized at the European level, in alternative to a harmonized regional 
architecture,  is a challenging issue. Many arguments support the view of centralizing and unifying 
financial regulation in the Eurosystem (in particular, an integrated supervision in a scenario 
dominated by conglomerates and characterized by the expansion of electronic communication 
                                                 
12 In Australia, the Financial Sector Reform Act of 1999 harmonized at the Commonwealth level financial rules and 
supervision assignments. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) protects investors, depositors 
and insurance policy holders. It regulates and enforces laws that promote fairness and proper behavior in financial 
markets and exchanges and of financial firms and advisors. It cooperates with other 3 main regulatory bodies (always at 
Commonwealth level). The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is responsible for ensuring that 
financial institutions will honour their commitments. It safeguards the soundness of deposit taking institutions, life and 
general insurance companies, and other financial firms after having inherited the powers and duties previously given to 
the central bank and to the Insurance and Superannuation Commission. Monetary policy and systemic stability are 
assigned to the Reserve Bank of Australia, which is the third institutional member represented in the Council of 
Financial Regulators, the official site where coordination efforts are pushed and conflicts resolved. Finally, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is charged with antitrust powers and responsibilities. 
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networks, market manipulation and trades on the net). However, the feasibility of a European 
centralized “supervisory” solution is made less likely by the fact that the Euro area might be too 
large to be controlled by one (or two) central agency, that many different rules are still in place with 
respect to commercial codes, company laws, corporate governance schemes, and bankruptcy 
procedures.  The EU directives, when they exist, do only establish a common floor; and even with a 
single currency and a common monetary policy, fiscal policies and taxation of financial services 
and other items are heterogeneous among member countries of the European Union. Besides, some 
form of national enforcement is probably still needed. 
 Hence, we still endorse our proposal of a European System of Financial Regulators (ESFR), 
structured like the ESCB and organized according to the regulation by objective model (see Di 
Giorgio and Di Noia, 2003). The ESFR would harmonize and coordinate financial regulation in 
member countries, design common principles and guidelines for prudential supervision and set out 
appropriate disclosure instruments and requirements. It would sponsor the necessary institutional 
changes at the domestic level, so as to merge and reorganize supervisory and regulatory powers in 
the financial sector of each member country. At the end of the process, in each country there would 
be just one national agency responsible for each objective of financial market regulation. This 
national agency would be part to a process of defining the general strategies and principles of 
financial regulation. It would be responsible for the national implementation of both the rules and 
the supervisory duties agreed upon at the Euro level.  
 In the 4-peak version, this reform calls for establishing two new European Agencies, one 
responsible for the microeconomic stability (“European Prudential Supervision Authority”) and one 
for transparency in the market, investor protection and disclosure requirements (“European 
Authority for Market Transparency”) of all financial intermediaries. These two central agencies 
would coordinate the different domestic agencies in each member country. Apart from this vertical 
form of coordination, cooperation would be also desirable horizontally, at both the European and 
national levels. This coordination, and resolution of eventual controversies, could be provided by 
special Commissions for the Supervision of the Financial System (as in the Corrigan Report, see 
Corrigan 1987) established at the European Commission and at national Treasuries. These 
commissions would be the natural place for activities involving proposals and consultation 
concerning measures regarding financial market regulation.  No antitrust power would be given to 
any member of the ESFR, so as to avoid the trade-off between competition on one side and stability 
and transparency on the other. Moreover, agencies responsible for supervising market competition 
do already exist at both Euro and domestic levels. It would be wise to transform in a third separate 
and independent central agency the EU Antitrust DG. This agency would coordinate and promote 
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the harmonized activities of domestic Antitrust agencies. In each member state, the national 
Antitrust agency would be responsible to safeguard competition in all economic sectors. Our 
suggested 4-peak model for financial regulation in Europe is sketched in figure 2. 
 We are aware that our proposed architecture is very ambitious and requires indeed a 
substantial amount of coordination among the different authorities. An additional and delicate 
problem is how to make these new agencies independent and accountable, a topic that deserves a 
separate investigation. Another important obstacle is the institutional and political resistance by  
existing national bodies whose powers would be diminished by the implementation of the proposal. 
We would like to stress that some good example of international cooperation and 
coordination efforts can already be found in the banking supervision, with the Basle Committee 
working on a wide range of topics with no formal by-laws, but a very strong leadership. At the EU 
level, after the Lamfalussy report, three “Level 3 Committees” (CESR, CEBS and CEIOPS, see 
above) assist the EU Commission in drafting level 2 regulatory measures using “comitology” 
powers13. It is to be underlined that while in all European countries the reforming path opted for 
either a single regulator or regulation by objective, at the European level the old Institutional 
approach has been followed with 3 separate committees for banks, securities and insurance (and 
pension funds). The national supervisory systems would gain both in consistency and effectiveness 
if all stability, transparency and competition oriented rules were either issued or (better) coordinated 
by distinct independent agencies at the Euro level.  
An application of our proposal for the US is actually contained in the mentioned Blueprint. 
Compared to Europe, the US framework would be greatly simplified by the elimination of one level 
of supervisory structures, given that it would not be probably necessary to have local supervisors in 
each of the 50 states. As a matter of fact, several US Federal agencies have already local branches. 
These may be re-organized in districts rather than at the state level since it is likely that fewer legal 
and cultural barriers exist among states. The “4-peak” model would maintain and enhance Fed’s 
responsibility for macrostability and the payment system. The new Prudential Supervision Agency 
would consolidate the FDIC, the OCC and the OTS and be endowed with all the prudential 
supervisory powers of local insurance regulators. The SEC (merged with CFTC and some insurance 
supervisor) would be given full responsibility for investor protection and market transparency. 
Antitrust powers would remain as they are. A coordination committee among those agencies and 
the Treasury should be appropriately designed and staffed. 
                                                 
13 Comitology refers to the delegation of implementing powers by the Council to the Commission for the execution of 
EU legislation: representatives of the member States, acting through Committees called “comitology committees”, 
assist the Commission in the execution of the implementing powers conferred on it (Wise Men, 2001). 
 
 16
 
5. Conclusions.    
In this paper, we have argued that financial market regulation should be re-designed and 
harmonized in the EU and the US according to a regulatory model by “objectives”. This calls for 
assigning to a limited number of distinct and independent agencies all supervisory powers and 
regulatory responsibilities in financial markets and on financial intermediaries, regardless of their 
functions and legal status. These agencies would be in charge, respectively, of microeconomic 
stability, investor protection and safeguarding competition in the financial sector. They would 
cooperate with the central bank for the purpose of guaranteeing macroeconomic stability and 
financial soundness.  
 In the Euro area, we favor the establishment of two new European financial regulatory 
agencies, distinct and independent of the ECB. These agencies would be responsible for 
coordinating legislation and execution of regulation in financial markets: the first European central 
agency would be responsible for the microeconomic stability of all intermediaries, while the second 
for transparency and disclosure requirements. The third objective of guaranteeing competition in 
financial (and non-financial) markets is already safeguarded by the Antitrust General Direction of 
the European Commission in addition to domestic agencies. It would be wise to transform the EU 
Antitrust General Direction in a central and independent European agency. The Antitrust General 
Direction and the two newly created central agencies would be at the center of three European 
Systems of Financial Regulators, each one structured similarly and working in connection to the 
ESCB, thereby requiring active participation of national agencies in member countries. It is 
essential maintaining both levels of regulation and supervision (European-national) in a federal 
system.  
 This proposal would face many difficulties. Even if there was a consensus on the final 
architecture of a financial market regulation, implementation would have political and institutional 
obstacles. Changes in the Treaty on the European Union are needed in order to establish new 
agencies. These can be proposed only in the next intergovernmental conference. Changes in 
national legislation of each Euro countries would also be required. Providing a satisfactory degree 
of accountability of the new agencies will be equally challenging. Furthermore, a well functioning 
and harmonized model of financial regulation and supervision would necessitate the participation of 
the United Kingdom. If it were not to join the Eurozone, the United Kingdom would have to fully 
participate into the newly created European System of Financial Regulators.  
 It is easy to predict strong national, political and institutional opposition to the proposal. 
Hence, full financial market integration would  require a much higher degree of political integration 
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in Europe. However, a movement in favor of a scheme similar to ours is emerging. There is already 
a semblance of federal system in place on macrostability and competition. As regards investor 
protection and conduct of business, the new Committees created after the Lamfalussy report (CESR 
and ESC) started to coordinate and guide the national securities regulators. The challenge is to 
establish prudential supervision and microstability for all financial intermediaries (as CEBS and 
CEIOPS started to work only recently). Given the consolidated experience of the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision and the recent positive experience of the ESC and CESR, it seems 
plausible that a new framework for financial market regulation and supervision will emerge in 
Europe, one based on harmonized regulation at European level and national supervision. As regards 
the US, the application of our scheme, along the lines contained in the Blueprint, would lead to a 
strong simplification and would enhance cooperation among regulators.  
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Table 1: Current Assignment of Responsibilities for Supervision  
    in Banking, Securities and Insurance Markets in the EU and US 
 
Country Banking Securities Insurance and 
pension funds 
Belgium U U U 
Denmark U U U 
Germany U U U 
Greece CB S G 
Ireland U (CB) U (CB) U (CB) 
Italy CB CB, S I/FP 
Luxembourg U U U/FP 
France CB,B B,S I 
Spain CB CB,S G 
Netherlands CB,S CB,S CB,S 
Portugal CB CB,S I 
Austria U U U 
Finland BS BS I 
Sweden U U U 
United Kingdom U U U/FP 
USA CB, B S,S I 
Sources: Updated from Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2003). 
 
Legenda:   CB: Central Bank,   BS: banking and securities supervisor,   B: banking supervisor, 
S: securities supervisor,   I: insurance supervisor,    G: government department,  
U:  single financial supervisor.  
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Figure 1.  A 4-Peak Regulatory Model by “Objectives” for the Financial Sector  
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Figure 3.  A 4-Peak Regulatory Model by “Objectives” for the Financial Sector in USA 
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